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Abstract:
Scholars have long been interested in the reasons why firms exist, arguing that they have efficiency
and productivity benefits over other approaches to organizing. We examine why entrepreneurs
often form firms, since entrepreneurial ventures are not large enough to accrue many of the
expected efficiency benefits from formality. Instead, we argue that there are reasons besides
efficiency (and regulation) that cause firms to exist. We suggest that an unrecognized implication
of new institutional and ecological theory leads entrepreneurs to establish firms as a legitimating
agent, and to allow them to act in industries with existing firm populations. We test this theory
by examining a unique sample of crowd-funded startup companies, to empirically identify the
advantages of formal versus informal organizations with different types of third party entities. We
find that adopting the mantle of a formal organization helps entrepreneurs in contexts where they
operate with other formal organizations, but not in interactions with other types of resource
holders. We also demonstrate that crowdfunding may have substantial benefits for entrepreneurs
beyond fundraising.

The question of why firms exist has been of interest to academics since at least the time of
Coase’s 1937 treatise on “The Nature of the Firm.” Examining large corporations, scholars have
identified a number of advantages that formal organizations might have over less formal markets
and exchanges, including decreased opportunism hazards in the presence ‘specific’ investments
(Williamson 1985); superior co-ordination and information processing structures (Thompson
1967; Galbraith 1977; Grant 1996); and productivity gains stemming from deploying tacit
capabilities and routines (Nelson and Winter 1982; Teece et al. 1997). While these efficiency
arguments serve to explain why large firms exist, they only partially address the existence of
another type of firm – the entrepreneurial organization.

Though entrepreneurship is the

ultimately the font of new organizations, the young, small ventures that entrepreneurs produce
might be expected to act very differently than more traditional firms – though both categories are
considered firms. Indeed, most entrepreneurial ventures start with few people, and often remain
at that size for considerable periods of time, if they grow at all (Hurst & Pugsley, 2010). At this
small scale, the efficiency arguments for firm formation are not sufficient, suggesting that firms
may serve other purposes. We suggest that a complimentary reason can be found using an
unrecognized implication of new institutional (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) and ecological (Hannan
and Freeman 1984) theory, causing firms to act as a legitimating agent, and to allow them to act
in industries with existing firm populations. We test this theory by examining a unique sample of
unexpectedly successful crowd-funded startup companies, to empirically identify the advantages
of formal versus informal organizations with different types of third party entities.

This perspective on why firms exist compliments traditional views of the value of firms.
From early work by Coase (1937) on firms and Weber (1946) on rational bureaucracy through a
wide variety of other scholars (Williamson 1985; Thompson 1967; Galbraith 1977; Nelson and
Winter 1982), formal organizations have been seen to offer substantial benefits in terms of
transaction costs, routinization, and other factors. While the exact organizational mechanisms
that cause the firm’s performance to be greater than a market-based approach to organizing
differ, in all of these perspectives, efficiency advantages are assumed to be at the root of formal
organizations. For example, Blau and Scott (1962) and Thompson (1967) have argued that firms
offer special efficiencies in coordination and control, while economists such as Coase (1937) and
Williamson (1985) have postulated that organizations arise when individuals would face too much
uncertainty and opportunism to use free market contracts. Even with these differences among
scholars, the common thread among all of these approaches is that they view formal organizations
as something that is explained by the benefits of the routines, structure, and knowledge provided
by being part of a firm.
While the theoretic focus has been on issues of efficiency, institutional theory suggests
that there may be other benefits. Firms can instead be socially necessary to facilitate individual
action, and they do so in a way that often makes their performance no more than the sum of their
individual members. While entrepreneurship scholars have observed some benefits of formally
organizing (Delmar & Shane, 2004), the nature of this benefit has been under-theorized
(Tornikoski & Newbert, 2007). We argue that many organizations exist due to an implication of
the foundational theories of both new institutional (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) and ecological
thinking (Hannan and Freeman 1984) on the forces that underlie the existence of firms. Those

theories imply that while individual entrepreneurs may not need the benefits of formal firms to
succeed, they may still need to wear the garb of organizations in order to do business with other
organizations. New firms therefore, are created in a self-perpetuating cycle – they arise not in
order to maximize functionality, but rather as a response to an environment which demands their
creation in order for a business venture to be taken seriously. They are for appearances only, each
built to appear as organizations that are more than the sum of their parts, even when they are
not.
The next section of the paper will further develop the theory that underlies the creation of
firms in environments that depend more on individual, rather than firm-level, contributions to
performance.

THEORY: CONFORMING TO DIFFERENTIATE
A critical aspect of entrepreneurial success is obtaining the resources needed for growth
from third parties; whether those be customers, capital, employees, or any other necessary thing
(Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Chatterji, 2008; Granovetter, 1985). With that context, let us consider how
an entrepreneur with an idea for a new product innovation goes about entering a market. To
make the matter concrete, assume that the product can be easily modularized and that all of the
production and development can be allocated via contract with few coordination demands and
minimal threat of opportunism. In short, assume that the product would be amenable to
development and sale through free agents. Note that whether founding a firm or not, the
entrepreneur relies on a team of other individuals to accomplish his or her goal; the alternatives
are simply either to employ those individuals inside an organization or to contract with free agents

as needed to acquire needed expertise and labor. If, in this hypothetical case, economic efficiency
was all that mattered, contracting with free agents would make logical sense, at it would avoid the
additional costs and administrative overhead associated with founding a firm. And yet, if this
entrepreneur is starting his project in an industry populated by other firms, in almost all cases our
intuition would be the opposite – we would expect to see the entrepreneur operate through a
firm, rather than as an individual. This intuition finds a theoretical foundation in both the new
institutional and ecological traditions.
Before examining these theoretical approaches, it is worth noting that entrepreneurship
research demonstrates that the road to organizational formation can be long (Katz and Gartner
1988) and that few nascent entrepreneurs actually succeed in creating firms (Carter, Gartner, and
Reynolds 1996). Additionally, some scholars challenge whether organizational formation is an
appropriate way to define entrepreneurship (Shane and Venkataraman 2000). Yet organizational
founding has been observed to be a key goal of entrepreneurs (Aldrich 1999), and it is the fact
that successful entrepreneurs found organizations that is of importance for our discussion, not the
fact that many fail in the process.
The first reason an individual might create an organization even when it does not
contribute to efficiency is the most obvious: organizations have a legal standing that makes them
advantageous for managing risk. This explanation is lacking, however, since if individuals only
formed organizations for legal reasons, we would expect that we would see the creation of
organizations as legal entities only, such as single-member limited liability corporations that can
effectively shield individuals from tax and liability concerns without the additional overhead of

establishing a formal organization (Jones Jr 1999). Yet single-member corporations are not the
dominant organizational form for most industries. This is because the existence of a firm as a pure
legal entity does not offer the same level of comfort to stakeholders – be they employees, lenders,
investors, suppliers, or customers – as a formal organization. These outside entities would hesitate
to place trust in mere legal fiction, because their concerns are neither legal nor even strictly
economic but are instead based on establishing that their potential partners are going to conform
to the roles expected of firms, including reliability and persistence. The same expectation of
reliability and persistence may be important to the individuals who would choose to work on a
project; they may only be comfortable working as employees within a firm for the perceived
stability of firms, as well as the benefits that firms can acquire from third parties, such as health
care.
This expectation, then, highlights the second reason that individuals would form firms:
firms are a requirement for acceptance in a world of organizations. The importance of this fact on
the evolution of industries is a consequence of a number of literatures, but is demonstrated most
clearly in the tradition of new institutionalism. Generally, new institutionalism has tended to
concentrate on understanding why so many firms look the same across industries (DiMaggio and
Powell 1983). The theory states that isomorphism is achieved through outside pressure, response
to uncertainty, and environmental factors. The resulting research tradition has demonstrated the
existence of isomorphism and diffusion of forms across industries (Burns and Wholey 1993;
Fligstein 1991). However, just as new institutionalism predicts isomorphism in response to
environmental pressures and uncertainty, so too, would it help explain why we find so few
industries in which individuals co-exist with, or even supplant, firms. When new entrants attempt

to enter an industry, they are subject to these institutional pressures and act to create isomorphic
firms in response.
The new institutional tradition, however, has focused on populations of firms, rather than
the ways in which individual firms might act in the face of institutional pressures. A more workable
framework based on similar premises, but which encompasses firm-level action, can be found in
Hannan and Freeman’s (1984) challenge of the idea that market efficiency is the sole reason that
firms are organized. Hannan and Freeman suggest that organizations offer two advantages over
individuals: reliability and accountability. Organizations are reliable precisely because they
routinize firm action, smoothing out individual differences and ensuring that an organization will
have lower performance variance than a randomly drawn free agent. A firm that appears to be
reliable to outside observers would also appear to be more than the sum of its individual parts.
That is because reliable firms embed their capabilities in routines, rather than people, because
routines endure in an organization while individuals do not. Toyota’s routines allow them to
efficiently produce quality cars in plants ranging from Tennessee to Tokyo, despite different and
changing workforces.
Similarly, organizations are accountable because they can rationally explain their actions,
making consistent arguments using appropriate rules and procedures. For example, firms can
demonstrate to employees that they offer predictable career paths, to investors that they have
formal management processes for money being spent, and to governments that they are
appropriately certified to do business. Again, this leads to the creation of firm-level routines that

are productive when they are adapted to the environment, but may not be productive when
environments change.
Extending Hannan and Freeman’s reasoning provides a way of understanding why firms
may exist even when they offer no advantages to, or perhaps even detract from, their individual
entrepreneurs. By being a part of the category of firms, these individuals achieve the status of
being reliable and accountable, fitting into the established category that is critical in order to be
taken seriously (Zuckerman 1999). This may involve individuals invoking the concept of an
organization, even when an organization does not exist. One entrepreneur interviewed by the
authors described this process as “pushing the line between what is real and what you want to
make real,” as he explained how he implied the existence of entire departments to potential
partners, without directly claiming that the then-imaginary groups had been established. A second
company founder described a case in which a company (later sold for $620 million) hired out-ofwork actors to play the part of a project team during an office visit by business partners in a
successful effort to demonstrate that the firm was properly organized and legitimate. While this
might be an extreme example of using a firm as a mere shell, the desire to do what was needed
to appear reliable and accountable was echoed by many firm founders.
An emerging literature on how entrepreneurs actively seek to build legitimacy
demonstrates that entrepreneurs are very conscious of their need to establish themselves as
reliable and accountable (Zimmerman and Zeitz 2002). For example, work by Zott and Huy (2007)
explores how entrepreneurs use symbolic actions (such as having an office in an impressive
building) to prove legitimacy to stakeholders, and therefore gain access to more resources. A

series of studies by Delmar and Shane (2003, 2004) found that business planning and the
establishment of formal entities lowered the chance of disbanding for a sample of Swedish firms,
which they argued was due to legitimating effects. Delmar and Shane, however, attribute those
legitimizing effects to firms wanting to avoid appearing as violating legal norms. While the study
of entrepreneurial legitimacy is still “in its infancy” (Zimmerman and Zeitz 2002:414), it suggests
that successful firm founders actively seek methods to make their efforts appear legitimate, even
if those efforts themselves do not directly relate to the main thrust of their business effort.
The pressure to create firms even when they are not adding to the productive capacity of
the constituent individuals can be seen from the perspective of outside institutions, as well as
entrepreneurs. First, firms in a particular market may be most comfortable dealing with other
firms, whether as customers or as service providers. Indeed, other players in a market may entirely
lack the capabilities required to deal with non-firm entities. One example of this is the fact that
most standard application and registration forms for everything from conferences to requests for
proposal require a title and a company name in order to be processed, putting those who are not
part of a formal organization at a disadvantage. A related case is that of government contractors,
which must have a variety of features available only to organizations; such as a unique Dun and
Bradstreet number, a special code that identifies companies that do business with the
government, and a Central Contractor Registration listing that is required by law for all potential
contractors. Beyond these practical considerations is the fact that justification to third-parties will
present an ongoing challenge to non-firms: consider, for example, that an entrepreneur who
attempts to sell products without a business card featuring a company name will face real
skepticism about the possibility of a long-term business relationship.

At the same time, the entrepreneurs themselves often face uncertainty as to the best way
to enter the industry in a productive way. Unlike the idealized world of Williamson, there is no
clear “market” to join in most cases, simply a universe of firms with which an individual must do
business. Furthermore, individuals are unlikely to care exactly about how they choose to enter a
market, whether by starting a firm or by acting as a free agent, since organizing is secondary to
the goal of actually making a profit from their business concepts. Individuals may thus find
themselves without clear examples of organizational forms, except for those that they themselves
have experienced or seen enacted elsewhere (Aldrich 1999). Thus, an emulative response from
individuals may recreate existing organizational forms. As another entrepreneur explained to the
author when asked why he did not start a freelance-based operation:
We never really saw it as an option. That was rarely seen as a model of success. We all
pattern ourselves, we see something and duplicate it. There wasn't a whole lot of that thing
going on. Anyone who was working out of their house was seen as a chickenshit operation,
not to be taken seriously. What kind of multimillion dollar contract are you going to get
working out of your basement?

The requirements to appear both accountable and reliable pressures entrepreneurs to
design an organization to be isomorphic to its market from the very beginning, creating a false
face that is a mirror image of existing, legitimized forms. Additionally, since an organization that
appears as a mere shell will not satisfy these requirements, the founders will have the incentive
to “cover their tracks” by ensuring the firm they create will appear to be a functioning
organization, rather than a simple collection of individuals. Creating this organization is likely not
the primary goal of entrepreneurs, rather it is a means to an end. Entrepreneurs need to organize
in order to gain access to the resources they need to proceed. They will conform to the

requirements of an organization so that they can differentiate themselves in other ways--the
equivalent of wearing a suit to a job interview (Phillips and Zuckerman 2007). The organization is
a means, not an end itself. Firms, with their associated costs in entrepreneurial time and
administrative overhead, thus act as middleman in each transaction, laundering the identity of
individual members, in return for a portion of the resources that would otherwise go to the
individual. They act as Potemkin Villages rather than real firms, set up to give the appearance of
a real organization in the same way that General Grigorii Potemkin set up the pasteboard facades
of towns in newly conquered lands to give the visiting Catherine the Great the illusion of a thriving
local economy.

HYPOTHESES
If, as we have argued, formal organizations allow entrepreneurs to strategically conform
in order to behave as members of the world of organizations, we would expect that it in markets
where organizations are the norm, and where the appearance of reliability and accountability are
key, that we would see the benefits of formality. In the context of entrepreneurship, there are
two common types of interactions where founders interact with third parties that expect to build
long-term relationships.

The first of these is building business partnerships with other

organizations. Whether alliances, distribution agreements, partnerships, or other inter-firm
relationships, these interactions are set firmly in the world of organizations.
A second context is that of finding and hiring employees. Potential employees have the
expectation of working for a “real company,” where payroll is regular and there is the possibility
for future gain. Again, it is advantageous to have the garb of a formal organization in order to
provide the assumed assurance of reliability and accountability. Note, however, that formal

organizations are not required ex ante for entrepreneurs to achieve either third-party
relationships or employees. Employees can and do work as independent contractors on a regular
basis. Similarly, business partnerships can cover all manner of potential arrangements, formal or
not, and conducted with individuals or organizations. Thus:
H1: Formal organizations are better able to secure human capital than informal
organizations
H2: Formal organizations are better able to achieve partnerships or alliances with
third parties than informal organizations
Even if these two hypotheses were supported, however, that would not allow us to
differentiate our theorized reason for which entrepreneurs choose to formally organize (the
assumed accountability and reliability of firms), with an alternative hypothesis, that formal
organizations generally are better at obtaining resources than informal ones. In order to address
this concern, we need to contrast these resources from “the world of firms” with resources from
third parties that do not require long term accountability and reliability. For entrepreneurial
ventures, two such parties are the press and individual customers. While outside press can be
useful to entrepreneurial success, there is no reason for a journalist to desire accountability and
reliability from an entrepreneur. Indeed, anonymous corporations are often less interesting to
read about than individual founders – witness the difference between coverage of Apple versus
that of Steve Jobs. Thus, we would expect little benefit from formal organizations in terms of
press.

H3: Formal organizations do not benefit more than informal organizations in
achieving press attention.
Similarly, we argue that in the context of relatively small one-time transactions (as opposed
to ongoing relationships), formal organizations offer little benefit in terms of building relationships
with individual customers. This is because customers express an interest in the good or service
being offered by the entrepreneur, rather than the entity offering the service. Whether the
entrepreneur takes on the trappings of a formal organization or not, formality is not likely to be a
large part of the reason why customers engage with a startup.
H4: Formal organizations do not benefit more than informal organizations in
engaging customers.

EMPIRICAL APPROACH
STUDY CONTEXT
In order to test these hypotheses, we needed a context in which formal and informal
organizations were given known initial resource endowments, and then allowed to use that
endowment to achieve outcomes both in the world of firms (outside capital, employees) and
outside it (customers, press attention). Generally, it has been hard to observe early stage
organizations at all, let alone ones where formal and informal organizations coexist. The unique
context of crowdfunding, however, provides just such an opportunity.
Crowdfunding refers to the efforts by entrepreneurial individuals and groups – cultural,
social, and for-profit – to fund their ventures by drawing on relatively small contributions from a
relatively large number of individuals using the internet, without standard financial
intermediaries (Mollick, 2014). For this study, our setting is Kickstarter – the largest reward-

based crowdfunding platform in the world. By April 2012, Kickstarter had raised more than $200
million for 20,000 projects, or about 44 percent of those that sought financing on the site
(Wortham 2012). Further, Kickstarter has served as an important launching ground for more
traditional entrepreneurial ventures. According to industry experts, many of the most important
projects in consumer electronics as of 2013 are funded by crowdfunding, including novel 3-D
printers, electronic watches, video game consoles, and computer hardware (Jeffries, 2013).
Further, some of the most successful crowdfunded projects were turned down by venture
capitalists, before successfully raising funding from sites such as Kickstarter (Jeffries, 2013).
Crowdfunding is likely to continue to evolve, but is viewed as an important and viable source for
raising funds for innovative technology startups (Mollick, 2014). Therefore we view it as a useful
context in which to consider entrepreneurial action.
To use Kickstarter, an entrepreneur (called “creator” on Kickstarter) creates a webpage for
the project on the platform explaining the purpose of the project and the specific deliverables that
they aim to produce with the contributed funds. Along with an end date for the project funding
cycle, the creator also indicates the funding goal of the project, i.e., the amount of money they
require to execute the project as specified. When a potential donor (called “backer” on Kickstarter)
visits an active project’s webpage, they are presented with all the project information initially
posted by the creator. In order to contribute, individuals must join the Kickstarter community (at
no cost) and can pledge funds to any project using a credit card (via Amazon). Projects continue
to raise funds until their deadline. If a project fails to reach its stated goal by the deadline, the
project creator receives none of the funds pledged. However, once a project has reached its
funding goal, it can continue to receive contributions until its deadline. As a result, funded projects

can exceed their original funding goal. Individuals contributing to a project do not receive equity
in the project in return for their funds. Specifically, backers do not receive any financial incentives,
returns, or repayment in exchange for their contributions. Instead, project creators typically offer
more modest “rewards” to contributors which vary by the level of contribution. The focus of the
present study is on projects that seek funding for the development of a product. In such cases,
project rewards typically represent producer pre-orders at discounted rates.

SAMPLE AND DATA C OLLECTION
We chose a sample frame of Kickstarter projects that were most similar to those of
traditional venture-backed entrepreneurial firms. Specifically, we looked at successful projects
between 2009 and 2012 in the Technology, Design, and Games categories with goals of at least
$5,000 that had committed to delivering products to customers. These categories together
represent 47 of the top 50 projects raising money on Kickstarter through 2013.
Of the 592 successful projects, we received responses from 270 of them (response rate of
45.6%). After accounting for incomplete and duplicate entries, we ended up with usable data from
187 successful projects (31.6% of the original sampling frame), although many partially complete
surveys were usable for certain parts of the study. Of the 1508 unsuccessful product-based
projects, we sent survey requests to a random sample of 492 of them. Of these 492 unsuccessful
projects, we received 135 responses (27.4% of the original sampling frame). After removing
duplicate and incomplete responses, we ultimately obtained complete data for 86 unsuccessful
projects (17.5%). Thus, our final sample consists of 273 of successful and unsuccessful projects
(although certain models may permit us to use a few more project responses). Our response rates
are in line with similar studies in the literature that have used web-based surveys (see Kriauciunas,

Parmigiani, and Rivera-Santos 2011, for a comprehensive review of response rates). For each of
our successful and unsuccessful subsamples, we conducted univariate tests to examine
differences between the projects in our final sample and those projects without responses. These
tests reveal no difference in the size of the goal, the level of funding success, the likelihood of
outside endorsements, whether the project was a featured Kickstarter project, and the duration
of the project. Overall there appears to be little evidence of respondent bias in our sample.
VARIABLES
For this study, we observe organizations after they achieved the funding required for their
product. Thus, all projects have been given a similar opportunity and initial resource endowment
from their successful crowdfunding campaign. We are interested in observing how formal or
informal status changes the way that organizations capture additional resources from other
sources, and how they ultimately succeed.
Dependent Variables

Our outcomes of interest represent several forms of ex-post campaign benefits. They
measure the extent to which the organization received benefits from the Kickstarter campaign
other than any funds raised. We have tracked four specific ex-post benefits, all of which were
measured using a 4-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (‘None’) to 4 (‘A Lot’). First, we examine Find
Employees – the degree to which the campaign helped organizations “find and/or hire
employees.” Our second dependent variable is Press Attention, a measure of the extent to which
the campaign helped “bring press attention to my project.” Engage Customers, measures whether
the campaign helped “develop a customer base from those who contributed.” Our final outcome
of interest, Business Partners, represents the extent to which the crowdfunding campaign helped

creators “find business partners or allies.” Means and standard deviations are reported in Table
1.
Explanatory Variables

We are interested in the effects of two explanatory variables in particular. Our first key
variable is the project’s original fundraising performance on Kickstarter. We measure this by
calculating the total funds raised by the project as a percent of its original goal (% Funded). Due to
the highly skewed nature of this variable, we log-transform it before we include it in our empirical
models. Our second explanatory variable is an indicator for whether the organization that
launched the campaign was formally established, or, as phrased in the survey, “a formal
organization (an incorporated company, partnership, or nonprofit).”

Examples of informal

organizations were “a group of artists, friends or hobbyists” or “a lone individual” who did not
incorporate. We measured formality at the time of the campaign. Formal, takes the value 1 if the
entity that launched the project was a formal organization (44.7% of projects met this criteria) and
0, otherwise.
Control Variables

We also wanted to control for an important issue associated with formality. First, we
wanted to ensure that we controlled for whether the organization was created for the campaign,
or was pre-existing. We measure that using the variable Established Prior to Campaign (34% of
formal organizations and 32% of informal ones were created for the campaign).
We also include binary controls for the overall objective of the project i.e., to establish a
new ongoing business (Objective: New Ongoing Business) or a new product from an existing
operation (Objective: New Product). The omitted reference objective is a one-time project.

We account for several non-exclusive reasons why the crowdfunding campaign was
pursued to begin with (through indicator variables): the project could not have been funded
without raising the goal (Campaign Reason: Could Not Be Funded); as a means to market the
project (Campaign Reason: Marketing); and as a way to connect directly with a community of
supporters (Campaign Reason: Community). Furthermore, we indicate whether the project
creators previously sought funding from several sources before the campaign: the creators
themselves (Sought Prior Funds: Creators); from family and friends (Sought Prior Funds: Family &
Friends); or an external company (Sought Prior Funds: External Companies).
We also control for the number of project founders (Number of Founders) and the change
in the number of employees from before the project, to its current state (Employee Growth).
Finally, we control for several project-level features of the Kickstarter campaign including its goal,
percent of goal raised, category, duration, year of launch, proof of next steps, and whether the
project was featured on Kickstarter’s homepage (see Mollick, 2014).
[Table 1 approximately here]

EMPIRICAL APPROACH
Though we control for many strategic factors and our testing (reported later) does not find
a significant difference between formal and informal firms in terms of their success in fundraising,
we would still be concerned that the difference in firm formality might represent a difference in
startup strategy. In order to mitigate these potential endogenity issues, we start with a factor
exogenous to intended strategy: the amount that a firm raised out of its goal. All founders in our
study would expect to meet their goal, but the degree to which they succeed or fail to do so is due
to backer interest, and is only revealed as the campaign progresses. Both failures and runaway

hits cannot be anticipated in advance. At the same time, the degree to which firms succeed or fail
in raising or exceeding their goals is a strong indicator of actual market interest in their product,
and (as our analysis shows) one of the most critical factors in the ability to gain long-term nonfinancial benefits from a crowdfunding campaign. We therefore look at the degree to which
formality increases or decreases the benefits that come from the degree of funding achieved.
Due to the ordinal nature of our ex-post outcomes of interest, we model Find Employees,
Press Attention, Engage Customers, and Business Partners using an ordinal logit specification with
robust standard errors. In order to test the moderating effect of Formal status on the relationship
between % Funded and our outcomes of interest, we cannot evaluate an interaction term in an
ordinal logit. As is well documented, interaction terms in non-linear models cannot be directly
interpreted, and both the sign and significance of the interaction term coefficient can be very
misleading (Ai and Norton 2003). As a result, we assess moderating effects by computing the
marginal effects of % Funded for Formal = 0 and Formal = 1, for each value of our ordinal outcome.
As an additional robustness test, we re-run our analyses using linear OLS models to confirm our
results.

RESULTS
[Table 2 approximately here]
The results of the primary analyses of ex-post campaign benefits are tabulated in Table 2.
Model (1) displays the results of the ordinal logit where we model Find Employees. We first
observe, as expected, that Log (% Funded) has a positive coefficient and is significant at the 0.1%
level. As a result, we have evidence that fundraising success on crowdfunding platforms improves

the ability of project creators to find and secure employees for their operations. This positive effect
of campaign performance witnessed when we model Press Attention, Engage Customers, and
Business Partners in Models (2), (3) and (4), respectively. As a result, we find that a campaign’s
performance on Kickstarter has a significant effect on the creator’s ability to find employees, seek
press attention, build a customer base, and secure new business alliances. When we compare the
coefficient of Log (% Funded) across models in Table 2, we find that it is larger for the outcomes
Press Attention and Engage Customers compared to Find Employees and Business Partners at a
statistically significant level (p-value < 0.01). Therefore, it appears that campaign performance
influences press attention and customer base to a greater extent than it does finding employees
and new business partners.
Given evidence of our initial assumption, we now turn to examine the moderating effect
of Formal on the effect of Log (% Funded). As a noted earlier, the sign and significance of the
interaction term (between Formal and Log (% Funded)) cannot be interpreted directly. As a result,
we suppress a table showing the results of ordinal logits with this interaction term included in the
model. Instead, we compute the marginal effects of % Funded for Formal = 0 and Formal = 1, for
each value of our ordinal outcome and tabulate the results.
[Table 3 approximately here]
[Figure 1 approximately here]
Table 3 displays the marginal effect of Log (% Funded) on the probability of each value of
Find Employees separately for formal groups and informal groups. We observe that in the case of
informal groups (Formal = 0), campaign performance does not appear to have a significant effect
on the probability of any level of Find Employees occurring. However, in the case of formal groups,

we observe that funding success is negatively related to the probability of deriving no employee
benefits whatsoever (Find Employees = 1). The marginal effect of Log (% Funded) is positive for
higher values of Find Employees. This indicates that greater campaign performance is more likely
result in higher employee benefits accruing to the group. In the last column of Table 3, we test
whether the difference in marginal effects between the formal and informal groups are statistically
significant. We find that Log (% Funded) has a larger marginal effect for formal groups than
informal ones in predicting higher levels of Find Employees. As a result, we conclude that the
formal status of the group has a positive moderating effect on the relationship between campaign
performance and finding new employees, as predicted in H1 (see Figure 1 for a graph depicting
this).
[Table 4 approximately here]
[Figure 2 approximately here]
Table 4 displays the marginal effect of Log (% Funded) on the probability of each value of
Business Partners, for formal groups and informal groups. The probability that a high value (3 and
4) of Business Partners occurs is positively related to prior campaign performance. We observe
that the marginal effect of Log (% Funded) is positive and significant for both formal and informal
groups in predicting higher levels of ex-post business partnerships. Furthermore, these marginal
effects are higher for formal groups than informal ones. The difference is marginally significant at
the 10% level when Business Partners = 3, but it is significant at the 5% level when we are
concerned with the likelihood of the highest level of Business Partners. The results of Table 4
support a consistent story – that as we consider higher levels of business partnerships, the effect

of campaign performance is greater for formal groups than informal ones. Therefore, the formal
status of the group has a positive moderating effect on the relationship between campaign
performance and securing business alliances (see Figure 2), as hypothesized in H2.
[Table 5 approximately here]
[Figure 3 approximately here]
We now explore the moderating effect of Formal on the effect of Log (% Funded) on Press
Attention. Looking at Table 5, we see that for lower values of Press Attention, Log (% Funded) has
a negative and significant marginal effect. This means that higher campaign performance is less
likely to result in minimal press coverage. Consistent with this, we see that Log (% Funded) has a
positive effect on the probability that the product receives very high levels of press attention (Press
Attention = 4). However, for the most part (except when Press Attention = 2), the difference in
marginal effects between formal and informal groups is insignificant. As a result, there is no
consistent evidence that Formal has a moderating effect on Log (% Funded) when it concerns Press
Attention, as predicted in H3.
[Table 6 approximately here]
[Figure 4 approximately here]
We finally consider the effect of campaign performance on the extent to which the
customer base is engaged with the project and product. In Table 6, we again see that for lower
values of our outcome (Engage Customers), Log (% Funded) has a negative effect, while it is more
positive for higher values of the outcome. More importantly, we find that the marginal effect of

Log (% Funded) for formal groups to be significantly lower than that for informal groups when
Engage Customers = 3. However, we find the reverse when we examine the probability that
Engage Customers = 4. The marginal effect of Log (% Funded) for formal groups is significantly
greater than that for informal groups for the highest outcome. This reversal in result over the
higher values of the dependent variable indicates that a clear trend is not available in this case. As
a result, the evidence does not support a positive moderating effect of Formal in the case of this
outcome, again as predicted in H4.
ROBUSTNESS TESTS
One concern regarding our analysis is that formal status may be significantly correlated
with fundraising outcomes. If formal groups systematically raise more funds than informal ones, it
would raise endogeneity concerns regarding our analysis of moderating effects. In Table 7, we
display the results of a linear OLS regression where we model fundraising performance (Log (%
Funded)). We see that Formal is not significant at the 5% level. Consequently, formal groups do
not raise significantly more funds that informal groups.
Another concern regarding our approach may be the method we used to test for
moderating effects. While computing marginal effects are recommended to overcome difficulties
with interaction terms in non-linear models (Ai and Norton 2003); we also display the results of a
linear OLS regression, where we treat our ordinal outcomes as continuous variables. In the case
of linear regression, interaction terms can be directly interpreted. Table 8 displays the results of
these models. We observe that Log (% Funded) X Formal has a positive and significant coefficient
when the outcomes are Find Employees and Business Partners. Consequently, the results of the
linear regression support our earlier evidence of moderating effects.

DISCUSSION
Our findings suggest that, as predicted, new ventures that are formal organizations have
some advantages over informal organizations, but that these benefits are not general to all firm
activities, and accrue when new ventures are operating in a context of other organizations. Formal
organizations are better able to access fundraising and human capital, but do not have the same
edge when interacting with customers and the press. The fact that formal organizations are more
efficient in some of these areas, but not all of them, supports our theory-building that formality
serves as a legitimating signal of reliability and accountability, rather than a pure efficiency
purpose alone.
The fact that some sets of firms are effectively Potemkin Villages – less about efficiency
than about the appearance of efficiency – serves to challenge a basic assumption about the
natures of firms: that the firms we observe in a market represent an organizationally efficient
response to the economic conditions of the market. In contrast, these firms may, instead, be
created to imitate other firms. Thus, to return to Williamson’s (1985) continuum of firms and
markets, the fact that the sequence is thick in the tails may have more to do with institutional
pressures than efficiency. This sort of pressure is acknowledged by firm founders, who understand
the fact that the act of having a firm itself is a critical success factor, even if a small group of
individuals is responsible for much of the work. Further, some of these firms would persist long
after the individuals who created the firm as a cover for individual action leave or change roles.
This is because over the early life of the firm, it acquires the reputation for the performance of its

individual members, making the firm appear both accountable and reliable, even after the original
individuals have left. Additionally, the organization becomes institutionalized itself, acquiring a
character and methods of its own (Selznick 1996), just as the Walt Disney Company became its
own organization, persisting long after Walt Disney himself was dead. We argue that this implies
that in any given industry we would expect to see that firms are more heterogeneous than is
currently assumed, including a mix of firms effectively hiding individual contributions, firms started
as covers for individual action that have become functional themselves, and firms that indeed
operate as more than the sum of their parts. This means that the degree to which performance is
embedded in the routines of the firm or in the abilities of individuals will vary greatly, both within
industries and between them. There is certain to be a sliding scale, where some industries are
indeed dominated entirely by firms that are built for efficiency (perhaps in capital intensive
industries such as auto manufacturing) and others with many younger firms that act primarily to
hide the role of individuals while giving them the cloak of reliability and accountability.
If formal organization is not required for coordination, it is still possible that individuals
need to be part of firms for reasons unrelated to efficiency. The analogy would be similar to that
of a baseball team, where the way that the team is organized is unlikely to in any way add to the
performance of individual players. Yet, even the best player would not be able to operate on his
own, since the competition itself is team-based. Teams exist not because team organization
matters, but because that is the way the game is played. In the same way, it may be that firms are
required for any one of a number of mundane reasons, from acquiring healthcare to providing a
feeling of stability to individual employees. But the fact that individuals might need to be part of
a firm to get these benefits does not mean that firms themselves are relevant to efficiency or

performance. Instead, it is the underlying assumption that firms provide reliability and
accountability over individuals that makes them important in the eyes of third parties. To be clear,
the fact that firms do not add to performance does not mean that every employee could succeed
as a free agent. Many industries might work like baseball, where if individuals want to participate,
they need to be part of an organization for underlying reasons that have nothing to do with
performance.
There are a number of limitations to this study. First, our population of crowdfunded
organizations may represent a different context than more traditional startup firms. To mitigate
this, we selected larger projects in categories that are traditionally amenable to startups for our
sample. Additionally, our survey provides some comfort that crowdfunded firms evolve into more
traditional organizations 90.6% of the crowdfunded projects we surveyed did turn into ongoing
businesses. Secondly, we rely on self-reported data in terms of benefits achieved through
crowdfunding campaigns. However, this data matched with the information learned from
extensive interviews with project founders, and there is little reason to think that retrospective
bias would affect only one set of organizations and not another.

CONCLUSIONS
We argued that, as a consequence of the need to prove reliability and accountability, firms
may simply serve as Potemkin villages, designed to give the appearance of conformity on things
that do not ultimately matter to efficiency (Phillips and Zuckerman 2007), rather than to fulfill a
specific organizational function. The fact that these organizations are primarily designed to
mediate between individuals and the industry in which they are embedded has significance

beyond just theories of the firm. As Stinchcombe (1965) showed, firms are shaped by the initial
conditions of founding, and these conditions can have effects that last the length of the
organizations (Hannan, Burton, and Baron 2002).
The implications of populations of firms acting as Potemkin Villages requires additional
study focusing on the long-term differences between firms that act as cover for individual founders
and those that function more as efficient organizations. Future research will also help in
understanding the spectrum of firm types within different industries, and how these types might
change as the industry evolves. Scholars who examine the role of firms within industries should
take into account that even though something looks like an efficient firm and is built like an
efficient firm, it may not be an efficient firm after all, but rather an organization created in
response to pressures to conform to a world where individuals are not viewed as reliable or
accountable enough to operate independently.
Finally, this study is also the first to look at the benefits of crowdfunding beyond initial
raising of funds. It identifies the factors that entrepreneurs, managers, and policymakers may be
able to manipulate in order to further improve the long-term benefits of crowdfunding. Our results
suggest that crowdfunding provides resources that support more traditional entrepreneurship.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable
Benefit: Finding Employees
Benefit: Press Attention
Benefit: Customer Base
Log (% Funded)
Formal
Established Prior to Campaign
Log (Goal)
Duration
Featured
Design
Technology
Project Year 2010
Project Year 2011
Objective: New Ongoing Business
Objective: New Product
Campaign Reason: Could Not Be Funded
Campaign Reason: Marketing
Campaign Reason: Community
Sought Prior Funds: Creators
Sought Prior Funds: Family & Friends
Sought Prior Funds: External Companies
Endorsements
Employee Growth
Number of Founders

Mean

Std Dev

Min

Max

1.520147
2.805861
2.599265
2.135531
-0.4020424
0.4468864
0.4175824
4.179332
38.80131
0.1025641
0.4542125
0.2930403
0.0805861
0.4175824
0.5714286
0.1758242
0.5091575
0.6227106
0.3919414
0.5421245
0.1428571
0.1611722
0.3479853
1.452381

0.8705542
1.14518
1.176836
1.021794
1.906891
0.498084
0.4940663
0.3788884
13.02839
0.3039459
0.4988135
0.4559927
0.2726983
0.4940663
0.4957805
0.3813696
0.5008343
0.4855985
0.4890803
0.4991374
0.3505698
0.368365
0.4772061
7.75009

1
1
1
1
-4.60517
0
0
3.69897
15
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-19

4
4
4
4
3.503847
1
1
5.69897
90
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
105

Table 2: Ordinal Logit of Ex-Post Campaign Benefits
Find Employees Press Attention
(1)
(2)
Log (% Funded)
Formal
Established Prior to Campaign
Log (Goal)
Duration
Featured
Design
Technology
Project Year 2011
Project Year 2012
Objective: New Ongoing Business
Objective: New Product
Campaign Reason: Could not be Funded
Campsign Crowdfunding: Marketing
Campaign Reason: Community
Sought Prior Funds From: Creators
Sought Prior Funds From: Family Friends
Sought Prior Funds From: External Financial Firms
Endorsements
Employee Growth
Number of Founders

Observations
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10

Engage Customers
(3)

Business Partners
(4)

0.239*
(0.109)
0.590+
(0.341)
0.552
(0.379)
1.431***
(0.378)
-0.00256
(0.0118)
1.067*
(0.487)
-1.017**
(0.371)
-1.021*
(0.404)
0.297
(0.648)
-0.0120
(0.685)
0.878*
(0.389)
0.186
(0.501)
0.0225
(0.295)
0.373
(0.359)
-0.0961
(0.374)
-0.0625
(0.301)
0.154
(0.377)
-0.349
(0.445)
0.00807
(0.315)
0.0229
(0.0281)
-0.193+
(0.117)

0.791***
(0.114)
-0.320
(0.336)
0.442
(0.315)
1.581***
(0.406)
0.0127
(0.00935)
1.390**
(0.509)
0.639+
(0.335)
0.500
(0.365)
-0.509
(0.492)
-0.947+
(0.517)
0.0754
(0.327)
0.121
(0.437)
-0.248
(0.261)
0.222
(0.292)
0.248
(0.328)
-0.0295
(0.285)
-0.408
(0.357)
0.389
(0.425)
0.790**
(0.295)
0.155**
(0.0496)
0.0746
(0.129)

0.817***
(0.114)
-0.0361
(0.296)
-0.0626
(0.295)
0.613+
(0.366)
0.00133
(0.00935)
0.195
(0.508)
-0.445
(0.333)
-0.667+
(0.347)
0.0741
(0.571)
-0.423
(0.595)
0.270
(0.328)
0.591
(0.394)
0.469+
(0.256)
0.763**
(0.276)
0.0325
(0.278)
0.0576
(0.253)
-0.204
(0.354)
0.332
(0.353)
0.126
(0.272)
0.0881**
(0.0293)
0.0855
(0.115)

0.408***
(0.0831)
-0.0799
(0.313)
0.366
(0.327)
0.800*
(0.362)
0.0158
(0.0114)
0.988*
(0.440)
0.0998
(0.354)
0.195
(0.340)
0.602
(0.538)
-0.0612
(0.552)
0.639*
(0.304)
0.0470
(0.428)
0.367
(0.261)
0.580*
(0.279)
0.0599
(0.299)
-0.203
(0.253)
-0.403
(0.378)
0.370
(0.365)
-0.239
(0.280)
-0.0130
(0.0230)
0.0266
(0.130)

273

274

273

273

Table 3: The marginal effect of Log (% Funded) on Find Employees across formal and informal
groups

Value of
Find Employees

Marginal Effect of Log(% Funded)
Formal = 0
(1)

1
2
3
4

(2) - (1)

Formal = 1
(2)

-0.012
0.006
0.004
0.002

-0.093 ***
0.024 **
0.034 **
0.035 *

-0.081 **
0.018 †
0.030 *
0.033 *

Figure 1: The marginal effect of Log (% Funded) on Find Employees across formal and informal
groups

Marginal Effects of Log (% Funded) on the likelihood of each
value of Find Employees
0.1

0.05

0
1
-0.05

-0.1

-0.15

-0.2

2

3

4
Formal = 0
Formal = 1

Table 4: The marginal effect of Log (% Funded) on Business Partners across formal and informal
groups

Value of
Business Partners
1
2
3
4

Marginal Effect of Log(% Funded)
Formal = 0
(1)
-0.060 ***
0.004
0.035 ***
0.022 ***

Formal = 1
(2)
-0.098 ***
-0.017 †
0.057 ***
0.058 ***

(2) - (1)
-0.038 †
-0.021 *
0.022 †
0.036 *

Figure 2: The marginal effect of Log (% Funded) on Business Partners across formal and informal
groups

Marginal Effects of Log (% Funded) on the likelihood of each
value of Business Partners
0.15

0.1

0.05
Formal = 0

0
1
-0.05

-0.1

-0.15

2

3

4

Formal = 1

Table 5: The marginal effect of Log (% Funded) on Press Attention across formal and informal
groups

Value of
Press Attention
1
2
3
4

Marginal Effect of Log(% Funded)
Formal = 0
(1)
-0.084 ***
-0.024 ***
0.008
0.100 ***

Formal = 1
(2)
-0.064 ***
-0.043 ***
-0.018
0.124 ***

(2) - (1)
0.020
-0.019 **
-0.026 †
0.024

Figure 3: The marginal effect of Log (% Funded) on Press Attention across formal and informal
groups

Marginal Effects of Log (% Funded) on the likelihood of each
value of Press Attention
0.2

0.15

0.1

0.05

Formal = 0
Formal = 1

0
1
-0.05

-0.1

-0.15

2

3

4

Table 6: The marginal effect of Log (% Funded) on Engage Customers across formal and informal
groups

Value of
Engage Customers
1
2
3
4

Marginal Effect of Log(% Funded)
Formal = 0
(1)
-0.098 ***
-0.022 ***
0.018 **
0.102 ***

Formal = 1
(2)
-0.083 ***
-0.056 ***
-0.021 †
0.161 ***

(2) - (1)
0.015
-0.034 **
-0.039 **
0.058 *

Figure 4: The marginal effect of Log (% Funded) on Engage Customer across formal and informal
groups

Marginal Effects of Log (% Funded) on the likelihood of each
value of Engage Customers
0.25
0.2
0.15
0.1
Formal = 0

0.05

Formal = 1

0
1
-0.05
-0.1
-0.15

2

3

4

Table 7: Linear Regression Model of Fundraising Performance
Log (% Funded)
Formal
Established Prior to Campaign
Log (Goal)
Duration
Featured
Design
Technology
Project Year 2011
Project Year 2012
Objective: New Ongoing Business
Objective: New Product
Campaign Reason: Could not be Funded
Campsign Crowdfunding: Marketing
Campaign Reason: Community
Sought Prior Funds From: Creators
Sought Prior Funds From: Family Friends
Sought Prior Funds From: External Financial Firms
Endorsements
Employee Growth
Number of Founders
Constant
Observations
R-Squared
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10

0.340
(0.209)
-0.215
(0.211)
-0.807**
(0.267)
-0.0145+
(0.00749)
1.598***
(0.298)
0.533*
(0.229)
0.260
(0.269)
0.0963
(0.326)
-0.175
(0.344)
0.0609
(0.238)
0.0280
(0.318)
-0.0584
(0.186)
0.0363
(0.221)
1.399***
(0.176)
0.0818
(0.197)
-0.608*
(0.238)
0.262
(0.262)
1.019***
(0.183)
0.00917
(0.00855)
0.165*
(0.0680)
1.834+
(1.080)
276
0.416

Table 8: Linear Regression Models of Ex-Post Campaign Benefits
Find Employees Press Attention Engage Customers Business Partners
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Log (% Funded)
Formal
Log (% Funded) X Formal
Established Prior to Campaign
Log (Goal)
Duration
Featured
Design
Technology
Project Year 2011
Project Year 2012
Objective: New Ongoing Business
Objective: New Product
Campaign Reason: Could not be Funded
Campsign Crowdfunding: Marketing
Campaign Reason: Community
Sought Prior Funds From: Creators
Sought Prior Funds From: Family Friends
Sought Prior Funds From: External Financial Firms
Endorsements
Employee Growth
Number of Founders
Constant

Observations
R-Squared
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10

0.0225
(0.0305)
0.257*
(0.125)
0.163**
(0.0494)
0.130
(0.128)
0.473**
(0.145)
-0.00153
(0.00365)
0.495*
(0.207)
-0.403**
(0.141)
-0.344*
(0.138)
0.125
(0.160)
0.0214
(0.164)
0.209+
(0.109)
0.0360
(0.156)
-0.0195
(0.103)
0.0658
(0.112)
-0.0373
(0.132)
0.0412
(0.0999)
-0.0261
(0.127)
0.0245
(0.158)
-0.0241
(0.119)
0.0115
(0.0107)
-0.0898*
(0.0413)
-0.417
(0.599)

0.321***
(0.0369)
-0.143
(0.123)
0.0243
(0.0550)
0.201
(0.123)
0.553***
(0.160)
0.00529
(0.00381)
0.329*
(0.138)
0.254+
(0.134)
0.192
(0.143)
-0.0476
(0.188)
-0.255
(0.209)
0.0551
(0.130)
0.0743
(0.171)
-0.0939
(0.106)
0.114
(0.116)
0.166
(0.119)
-0.0576
(0.111)
-0.156
(0.135)
0.220
(0.161)
0.340**
(0.114)
0.0112*
(0.00561)
0.0125
(0.0504)
0.0687
(0.657)

0.338***
(0.0403)
0.0182
(0.129)
0.0688
(0.0508)
-0.0213
(0.128)
0.329*
(0.158)
0.000320
(0.00444)
-0.0186
(0.203)
-0.205
(0.146)
-0.235
(0.152)
0.0487
(0.235)
-0.176
(0.249)
0.120
(0.145)
0.288+
(0.171)
0.155
(0.111)
0.325**
(0.121)
0.0731
(0.131)
-0.000155
(0.110)
-0.0657
(0.143)
0.198
(0.159)
0.114
(0.124)
0.0160*
(0.00631)
0.00895
(0.0534)
1.051
(0.670)

0.140***
(0.0360)
0.0319
(0.143)
0.126*
(0.0555)
0.172
(0.139)
0.356*
(0.167)
0.00788
(0.00499)
0.409*
(0.192)
0.0456
(0.151)
0.0749
(0.150)
0.353
(0.222)
0.00677
(0.230)
0.240+
(0.134)
-0.0128
(0.185)
0.157
(0.118)
0.283*
(0.123)
0.0620
(0.137)
-0.0822
(0.111)
-0.185
(0.153)
0.247
(0.163)
-0.0949
(0.126)
-0.00595
(0.00881)
-0.00610
(0.0562)
-0.255
(0.683)

273
0.247

274
0.520

273
0.478

273
0.304

